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How the Signing Statement Thought it Killed the 
Veto; How the Veto May Have Killed the Signing 
Statement 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 1 of the Constitution provides a method and procedure for the 
President to reject laws passed by Congress.  ―Every Bill which shall 
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it 
become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he 
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it. . . .‖1  The method 
became known as the President‘s veto power. For most of the nation‘s 
history, this veto power was the Executive‘s primary tool in combating 
legislation he disagreed with or thought unconstitutional. 
In the past three decades, another tool, the signing statement, has 
grown in popularity. The popularity of the signing statement culminated 
during the presidency of George W. Bush. Through his first term of 
office, President Bush did not invoke the veto power.
2
 In fact, it was not 
until July of 2006, more than five years after taking office, that President 
Bush first used the power to strike down a bill.
3
 As of March 8, 2008, 
President Bush had vetoed a total of nine bills, the last of which was a 
high-profile veto of a bill that would have prohibited the Central 
Intelligence Agency from using waterboarding as an interrogation tactic.
4
 
While increased use of the veto in the last two years would not be labeled 
as widespread, it presents a stark contrast to the first four years of 
President Bush‘s presidency. Although this increased use may be 
attributed to control of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
shifting from Republicans to Democrats, a shift in the frequency of use 
of another presidential tool sheds some light on another possibility. 
Between taking office in 2001 and the end of 2006, President Bush 
issued over 130 signing statements. In 2007 President Bush issued only 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 2. See Charles Babington, Stem Cell Bill Gets Bush’s First Veto, WASH. POST, July 20, 
2006, A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/19/ 
AR2006071900524.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Stephen Lee Myers, Op-Ed, Veto of Bill on C.I.A. Tactics Affirms Bush’s Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/washington/09policy.html 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2008). 
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eight signing statements and, as of the end of October, 2008, he has 
issued only three.
5
 During the time when his use of the signing statement 
was frequent, President Bush had no need for the veto. To quote Charlie 
Savage, President Bush ―virtually abandoned his veto power, signing 
every bill that reached his desk during his first term even as he used 
signing statements to eviscerate them.‖6 When he began using the veto 
more regularly, his signing statement usage decreased. During the Bush 
administration, the country saw the death of the presidential veto at the 
hands of the signing statement. But the country has also seen the veto 
rise from its shallow grave to regain its proper place in the constitutional 
toolbox of the President. 
While the veto power is rooted in the powers of the Constitution, the 
same Constitution is silent on signing statements. It neither grants the 
President the power to ignore laws nor forbids him from doing so.
7
 It 
simply provides that the President ―shall Take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.‖8 Additionally, the President swears an oath of office 
to ―preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.‖9 
These two clauses of the Constitution are the center of the whole debate 
but do not, on their own, clarify the duty of the President. On one hand, 
the President swears to uphold the law, and when he signs legislation, it 
becomes law. On the other hand, he swears to uphold the Constitution. If 
he believes a portion of a law to be unconstitutional, he cannot enact the 
law while honoring his oath—unless he believes an unconstitutional law 
is void regardless of whether he signs it. 
This paper examines the legal effect of the signing statement, and 
why the veto has become the legislative tool of choice for the President 
once again. Part II of this paper examines the history and use of the 
signing statement from President Monroe to the present. Part III will 
examine the constitutionality of the different uses of the signing 
statement. Part IV will examine whether the signing statement deserves 
the attention it has received. 
 
 
 
 
 5. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Presidential Signing Statements, The American 
Presidency Project, 2008, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.php (last visited Oct. 
14, 2008). 
 6. Charlie Savage, Introduction: The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2007). 
 7. Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 15 (2007). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
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II.  PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: HISTORY IN THE 
NEWSPAPERS 
 
Signing statements have more than 180 years of historical 
precedent.
10
 This alone is strong evidence that they are an appropriate 
exercise of executive power. Still, President George W. Bush has drawn 
a lot of fire for his use of this tool. To understand why this use has been 
so controversial it is necessary to look at the historical evolution and use 
of this tool. 
 
A.  Bush and the Reporter 
 
In April of 2007, President Bush‘s approval ratings hovered between 
31 and 38 percent.
11
 During the same month, Boston Globe reporter 
Charlie Savage reached a career pinnacle, winning a Pulitzer Prize for a 
series of articles reporting on Bush‘s prolific use of signing statements.12 
Savage reported, ―President Bush has quietly claimed the authority to 
disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, asserting that 
he has the power to set aside any statute passed by Congress when it 
conflicts with his interpretation of the Constitution.‖13 Bush claimed he 
has the power and duty to ignore any laws that attempt to encroach on his 
constitutionally allocated executive powers.
14
 Perhaps it was President 
Bush‘s broad interpretation of those executive powers or just the power 
of the press in the face of an unpopular President, but either way, 
Savage‘s reporting has brought President Bush‘s use of the signing 
statement to a grinding halt.
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10. ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine Recommendation, 7 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Report], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/ (last visited April 17, 2008Oct. 14, 2008). 
 11. President Bush: Overall Job Rating in National Polls, Pollingplace.com, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last viewed Oct. 14, 2008). 
 12. Boston Globe City & Region Desk, Globe Wins Pulitzer Prize for Series on Bush Efforts 
to Expand Presidential Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/2007/04/globe_wins_puli_1.html. 
 13. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_ 
of_laws/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See Woolley & Peters, supra note 5. In 2006, Bush issued 27 signing statements, some 
with multiple challenges. In 2007, he issued just eight.  In 2008, he has issued only three signing 
statements. 
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B.  What is a Signing Statement? 
 
Before launching into a greater discussion of the constitutionality of 
the signing statement, it is important to define what a signing statement 
is. It has been defined as: 
Pronouncements issued by the President at the time a congressional 
enactment is signed that, in addition to providing general commentary on 
the bills, identify provisions of the legislation with which the President 
has concerns and (1) provide the President‘s interpretation of the 
language of the law, (2) announce constitutional limits on the 
implementation of some of its provisions, or (3) indicate directions to 
executive branch officials as to how to administer the new law in an 
acceptable manner.
 16
 
This definition is instructive in giving an overview of what the 
signing statement is and how it is used. This paper will use this definition 
as the basis of my discussion of signing statements. 
 
C.  History 
 
It is important to understand that the Constitution says nothing about 
the President issuing a statement when signing a bill, except to explain 
his objections when vetoing legislation.
17
 Still, Presidents have long used 
the signing statement to praise Congress, explain their views on the 
meaning of laws, and to object to laws on constitutional grounds. It is 
entirely uncontroversial for a President to issue a statement regarding a 
bill; it is only when the statement purports to interpret or limit the law on 
constitutional grounds that the controversy arises. 
The history of the signing statement traces back to James Monroe 
who signed into law a bill limiting the size of the army and the means of 
selecting officers and then issued a statement a month later explaining 
that the President alone held the power to select officers.
18
 Andrew 
Jackson and John Tyler each issued statements objecting to provisions in 
bills they signed into law.
19
 
Ulysses S. Grant brought about the next manifestation of the 
presidential signing statement, often called the constitutional avoidance 
technique.
20
 He issued a statement in which he said he would interpret a 
 
 16. Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 516–17 (2005). 
 17. U.S. CONST art. I, § 7 (―he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated. . . .‖). 
 18. ABA Report, supra note 10, at 7. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 8, 9. 
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provision he thought unconstitutional in a way that would overcome the 
problem.
21
 The bill attempted to close a number of consular and 
diplomatic offices.
22
 President Grant thought it ―an invasion of the 
constitutional prerogatives and duty of the Executive‖ and said he would 
accordingly construe it as intending merely ―to fix a time at which the 
compensation of certain diplomatic and consular officers shall cease and 
not to invade the constitutional rights of the Executive.‖23 This type of 
signing statement, which purported not to disregard the law, but to 
interpret it, became a standard tool for later Presidents ―to mold 
legislation to fit their own constitutional and statutory preferences.‖24 
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin 
Roosevelt each employed presidential signing statements to refuse to 
implement legislation with which they disagreed on policy grounds.
25
 
One of Franklin Roosevelt‘s signing statements was cited in a Supreme 
Court decision for United States v. Lovett.
26
 The signing statement said 
that the act of Congress was a Bill of Attainder, and therefore, 
unconstitutional.
27
 In that case, the Supreme Court agreed with Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s classification of the act and held the law unconstitutional.28 
Franklin Roosevelt also revived the constitutional avoidance technique 
when he used a signing statement to send a message to Congress that if 
Congress did not remove a provision he thought unconstitutional, he 
would not implement it.
29
 He did, however, sign the bill into law.
30
 
Interestingly, rather than being forced to stand by his signing statement, 
Franklin Roosevelt put enough pressure on Congress with his statement 
to bring about a change in the legislation.
31
 
After President Franklin Roosevelt, Presidents Harry Truman, 
Dwight Eisenhower, and Richard Nixon each used signing statements to 
state their intention to not enforce unconstitutional provisions.
32
 
Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson each used signing 
statements to interpret legislative vetoes as information requests, to avoid 
what would have amounted, in their minds and later in the opinion of the 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 7–8. 
 23. Id. at 8. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. citing 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
 27. See U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 305–06. 
 28. See id. at 318. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. 
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Supreme Court, to an unconstitutional exercise of power.
33
 President 
Jimmy Carter also used the signing statement to indicate his intention to 
ignore a congressional mandate to close consular offices and, instead, 
interpreted the mandate as merely ―precatory.‖34 
In the three decades that followed the Carter Administration, the 
signing statement was more widely used than ever before. In a report for 
Congress, T.J. Halstead broke down the usage of the signing statement 
since Reagan.
35
 
 
President Reagan issued 250 signing statements, 86 of which (34%) 
contained provisions objecting to one or more of the statutory 
provisions signed into law. President George H. W. Bush continued 
this practice, issuing 228 signing statements, 107 of which (47%) raised 
objections. . . . President Clinton made aggressive use of the signing 
statement, issuing 381 statements, 70 of which (18%) raised 
constitutional or legal objections. President George W. Bush has 
continued this practice, issuing 152 signing statements, 118 of which 
(78%) contain some type of challenge or objection.
36
 
 
Halstead estimated President George W. Bush‘s signing statement 
objections to exceed one thousand.
37
 Each of these Presidents used the 
signing statement as an important tool in creating and dictating policy. 
The modern use of the signing statement started with President 
Ronald Reagan.
38
 Reagan used the signing statement as a weapon to 
influence legislation, court interpretations, and Executive Branch 
applications.
39
 To do this, Attorney General Edwin Meese contracted 
with West Publishing to include signing statements in the United States 
Code Congressional and Administrative News along with traditional 
legislative history.
40
 This helped the Reagan Administration get several 
signing statements cited in Supreme Court opinions.
41
 
President George H. W. Bush continued to expand the use of the 
signing statement, particularly in foreign affairs issues.
42
 President Bill 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. T.J. Halstead, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Presidential Signing 
Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, ii (updated Apr. 13, 2007) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf (last viewed Oct. 14, 2008). 
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See ABA Report, supra note 10, at 10. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Id. 
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Clinton used signing statements less frequently than President George H. 
W. Bush, but still more than President Reagan. ―For the Clinton 
Administration, ‗the signing statement was an important cornerstone of 
presidential power . . . .‘‖43 
Although George W. Bush certainly did not invent the signing 
statement, he certainly took its use into uncharted territory. An American 
Bar Association taskforce charged with studying and reporting on the 
constitutional and legal implications of signing statements estimated that 
all Presidents from 1776 to 2000 produced about 600 challenges through 
signing statements.
44
 President George W. Bush has produced over 800.
45
 
This heightened use garnered attention, not only from Charlie Savage 
and the press, but from Congress as well. ―Congress finally enacted a law 
requiring the Attorney General to submit to Congress a report of any 
instance in which . . . any officer of the Department of Justice established 
or pursued a policy of refraining from enforcing any provision of any 
federal statute. . . .‖46 The legislation reached the President‘s desk and 
was signed into law accompanied by a signing statement ―insisting on 
the President‘s authority to withhold information whenever he deemed it 
necessary.‖47 
This level of constitutional objections by presidential signing 
statement is unprecedented in the historical analysis. Although the 
practice has quietly existed almost as long as our nation, the signing 
statement has now come to the forefront of American news and politics. 
Because of this newfound prominence, scholars, lawmakers, and judges 
are taking a closer look at the legal foundations of this Executive tool. 
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
 
While there is clearly great debate about the constitutionality of 
presidential signing statements, it is important to delineate the types of 
signing statements in order to examine their constitutionality. Signing 
 
 43. Id. at 12. 
 44. Id. at 14. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. Id. See President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of 
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Nov. 2, 2002, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73177 (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (―The 
executive branch shall construe [these sections] in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authorities of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the 
disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of 
the Executive, or the performance of the Executive‘s constitutional duties.‖). The President used this 
same phraseology on several provisions of the Act. 
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statements can be classified in three groups: (1) press releases;
48
 (2) 
statutory interpretation for legislative history, bureaucratic instruction, or 
constitutional avoidance;
49
 (3) and statement of intention not to execute 
laws.
50
 The press release type of signing statement is entirely 
uncontroversial. The statutory interpretation signing statement can be 
more controversial, depending on the purpose of the statement. Finally, 
the expression of the President‘s intention not to enforce a law is the 
least common, but raises the most debate. 
 
A.  Press Releases 
 
There is no debate about the constitutionality of the press release 
signing statement.
51
 While nothing in the Constitution authorizes this 
statement, the statement does nothing except express the thoughts of the 
Executive upon signing the bill into law. It is the equivalent of the 
President standing up in a press conference. President Clinton provided 
many examples of this type of signing statement like this one: 
 
Today I am pleased to sign into law H.R. 4283, the ―Africa: Seeds of 
Hope Act of 1998.‖ This Act, which passed the Congress with broad 
bipartisan support, reaffirms the importance of helping Africans 
generate the food and income necessary to feed themselves. It is an 
important component of my Administration‘s efforts to expand our 
partnership with Africa and complements our efforts to expand trade 
and investment through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
which I hope will be passed by the next Congress.
52
 
 
The statement does not purport do to anything; it only allows the 
President a means to express the importance of the issue and encourages 
further legislation on the subject. This type of signing statement has no 
legal force or influence. Thus, it raises little controversy. 
 
 48. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Using Presidential Signing Statement to Make Fuller Use of the 
President’s Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting Law, Office of Legal Counsel 
Memorandum, Feb. 5, 1985, available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-
89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SGLSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf. ―Presidential approval is 
usually accompanied by a statement that is often little more than a press release.‖ Id. 
 49. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 516–17. 
 50. See discussion supra, part III.D. 
 51. See 17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 131–32 (1993) [hereinafter OLC Signing Statements] 
(―It appears to be an uncontroversial use of signing statements to explain to the public . . . what the 
President understands to be the likely effects of the bill, and how the bill coheres or fails to cohere 
with the Administration‘s views or programs.‖). 
 52. President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Africa: Seeds of Hope Act of 
1998, November 13th, 1998, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55272. 
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B.  Statutory Interpretation in Signing Statements 
 
The Executive Branch engages in statutory interpretation every day; 
it does this for a variety of reasons. First, it must implement laws, and to 
do so, it must have a clear understanding of what the laws mean. Second, 
it often seeks to place its own stamp on the legislative history, and 
thereby influence courts. Third, it is the constitutional duty of the 
Executive Branch to engage in constitutional appraisal of new laws. 
 
1.  Bureaucratic instruction 
 
It is the Executive‘s duty to see that the laws are implemented.53 To 
do this, some degree of interpretation is required. Presidents have often 
used signing statements as a means of instructing the Executive Branch 
officers who will ultimately be responsible for the implementation. This 
instructional type of signing statement application is fairly 
uncontroversial. The Executive Branch‘s opinion is that ―the President 
has the constitutional authority to supervise and control the activity of 
subordinate officials within the [E]xecutive [B]ranch.‖54 
This view is supported by the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Bowsher v. Synar.
55
 ―Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to 
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‗execution‘ of 
the law.‖56 Of course, this does not give the President explicit 
authorization to interpret any statute any way he pleases. Professor 
Nicholas Rosenkranz explained at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing: 
―[The President] has a constitutional duty to ‗take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,‘ and this faithfulness inherently and inevitably 
includes a good faith effort to determine what ‗the Laws‘ mean.‖57 
Furthermore, it is the President‘s duty and right to oversee the execution 
of the law by his subordinates.
58
 ―[The President] may properly supervise 
and guide [subordinates‘] construction of the statutes under which they 
act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the 
 
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 54. OLC Signing Statements, supra note 51, at 132 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 
U.S. 788, 800 (1992)(―It is hard to imagine a purpose for involving the President if he is to be 
prevented from exercising his accustomed supervisory powers over his executive officers.‖)). 
 55. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 733. 
 57. The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
109th Cong. (2006) (Statement of Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center) [hereinafter Rosenkranz Senate]. 
 58. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
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laws . . . .‖59 Unfortunately, there seems to be no test for how a President 
should go about interpreting the legislation to comply with this 
requirement. It is apparent that the President should consult with the 
legislative history to determine congressional intent. Beyond that, the 
criteria for determining the validity of an interpretation by the President 
remain nebulous. It could reasonably be expected that the Executive 
would follow the same path in reaching his interpretation as a federal 
court would.
60
 Still, as long as the Executive is indeed making a good 
faith effort to interpret and execute the laws, there should be no 
constitutional debate about the legal effect of the interpretation. 
But because of the nature of signing statements and the realities of 
the process, it seems unlikely that any signing statement could 
reasonably comply with the good faith standard discussed above. The 
Executive Branch lacks both time and manpower to conduct such an 
intensive review of each legislative act. 
Because of time restraints, properly interpreting a statute and 
inserting a signing statement may be difficult. The President only has ten 
days to sign or veto a bill once it has reached his desk.
61
 In 1985 Samuel 
Alito, then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice 
Department, wrote a memorandum on the interpretive uses of signing 
statements.
62
 In that memo, he outlined some of the problems with an 
expanded use of signing statements for interpretive purposes.
63
 One of 
those problems was the ten-day time constraint. ―Since presidential 
signing statements have traditionally been issued at the time of the 
signing of legislation, very little time has been available for the 
preparation and review of such statements.‖64 Another major problem, 
according to Alito, would be manpower.
65
 ―In all likelihood, it would be 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Rosenkranz Senate, supra note 57.  
 
The President interprets statutes in much the same way that courts do, with the same 
panoply of tools and strategies. His lawyers carefully study the text and structure of Acts 
of Congress, 13 aided perhaps by dictionaries, linguistic treatises, and other tools of 
statutory interpretation. In addition, just like courts, they also apply well–established 
maxims of statutory interpretation, called canons. 
 
Id. 
 61. U.S. Const. Art I § 7 (―If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days 
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner 
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it 
shall not be a law.‖). 
 62. Alito, supra note 48, at 2. 
 63. Id. at 2–3. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. 
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necessary to create a new office with a substantial staff to serve as a 
clearinghouse for statements . . . .‖66 
The problems of time constraints and shortage of manpower still 
exist for the Executive. The Executive Branch has not created a new 
office to create signing statements with good-faith legal interpretations. 
For these reasons it is unlikely that statements have been made based on 
good faith interpretations of legislative history and intent, even when 
purporting to interpret laws for the instruction of Executive Branch 
subordinates. 
There is, however, a strong argument for inclusion of interpretation 
in signing statements. By including his interpretation in a signing 
statement, the President is making the interpretation public information 
and it is more likely to be enforced: 
 
In short, in the United States, we have a strong preference for sunlight 
in government. Once it is clear that interpreting the law is essential to 
executing it, there can be no independent objection to the President 
making his interpretations public. This is the primary function of 
presidential signing statements . . . .
67
 
 
Any argument about the constitutionality of this method may be 
moot because these interpretations may be difficult to implement. Alito 
also argued that he anticipated friction between an Executive Branch unit 
charged with the good-faith interpretation of the legislation ―and the 
various departments and agencies wishing to insert interpretive 
statements into presidential signing statements.‖68 In short, the 
bureaucracies would be unwilling to accept an interpretation of a law 
with which they did not agree and would lobby within the Executive 
Branch to have their interpretation included. Although the President 
ultimately has the power to replace almost any high-ranking Executive 
Branch official who disagrees, it is unlikely that he would risk alienating 
a powerful bureaucracy and therefore would find himself caught between 
conflicting interpretations. This bureaucratic stubbornness may be the 
core reason that this interpretive signing statement has little legal effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Rosenkranz Senate, supra note 57. 
 68. Alito, supra note 48, at 3. 
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2.  Statutory interpretation for legislative history 
 
While it is clear that the President has the power to interpret laws for 
the instruction of Executive Branch officers, more controversy arises 
when the signing statement includes the interpretation for the purpose of 
establishing legislative history. That the President is not a legislator is 
clear. ―All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.‖69 The Constitution clearly and purposefully vested 
all the legislative power in the Congress, and apportioned none to the 
President. Professor Rosenkranz described the President‘s role in 
legislating as ―the power to ‗approve‘ or disapprove legislation; it is a 
simple, binary, up-or-down decision, subsequent to, and distinct from, 
the legislative process.‖70 If that is the only role of the President in 
creating law, is it appropriate for the courts to consider the President‘s 
interpretation when examining the validity or constitutionality of the 
law? During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Professor 
Rosenkranz pointed out that this may be an overly formalistic view of the 
President‘s role. 
 
In reality, the administration often drafts legislation, and even when it 
does not, the entire legislative machinery operates in the shadow of the 
President‘s veto power. On this view, the President‘s understanding of 
a bill as reflected in a signing statement is at least as important as the 
understanding of Congress reflected in legislative history.
71
 
 
Some scholars have even considered the President a ―third house of 
Congress,‖ because of his high level of involvement in the legislative 
process.
72
 If this view is correct, then it follows that it would be 
appropriate for the President to comment on new legislation, just as it 
would be for Senators and Representatives. 
Regardless of the appropriateness of such signing statements, they 
have little effect for statutory interpretation outside the Executive Branch 
unless the courts consider them. As a matter of legal precedent, several 
courts have used executive interpretation when conducting their own 
 
 69. U.S. CONST. Art 1, § 1. 
 70. Rosenkranz Senate, supra note 57. 
 71. Id. 
 72. OLC Signing Statements, supra note 51, at 136, (citing CLINTON ROSSITER, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 96 (Johns Hopkins Press 1987) (1956)) (―[H]e is now expected to make 
detailed recommendations in the form of messages and proposed bills, to watch them closely in their 
tortuous progress on the floor and in committee in each house, and to use every honorable means 
within his power to persuade . . . Congress to give him what he wanted in the first place.‖). 
 167] PRESIDENTIAL VETO AND SIGNING STATEMENTS 179 
interpretations. In United States v. Story, a federal appellate court had to 
decide how to construe a portion of a minimum mandatory sentencing 
statute.
73
 In doing so, the court relied on a signing statement President 
Reagan attached to the legislation.
74
 The court reasoned that although ―in 
some circumstances there is room for doubt as to the weight to be 
accorded a presidential signing statement in illuminating congressional 
intent. . . President Reagan‘s views are significant here because the 
Executive Branch participated in the negotiation of the compromise 
legislation.‖75 The President‘s involvement in the legislative process 
added weight to his interpretation in the signing statement. In at least two 
other cases, federal appellate courts have used presidential signing 
statements in interpreting statutes. In Berry v. Department of Justice, 
when reviewing the Freedom of Information Act, the Ninth Circuit 
referred to President Lyndon Johnson‘s signing statement on goals of the 
act.
76
 In Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, the Fourth Circuit relied on 
President Harry Truman‘s signing statement describing the proper legal 
standard for the Portal-to-Portal Act.
77
 
While some courts have given at least some weight to signing 
statements, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court apparently 
ignored—but did not disavow—a presidential signing statement when 
interpreting the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).
78
 In Hamdan, the 
government argued that the DTA removed Hamdan‘s case from the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and therefore it was not subject to 
review by the Supreme Court.
79
 The Court rejected the Government‘s 
construction of the statute, basing its reasoning on the ―ordinary 
principles of statutory construction.‖80 In doing so, it construed an 
absence of a jurisdiction stripping provision as an intentional act by 
Congress.
81
 When signing the legislation, President Bush had included a 
signing statement which provided: ―[T]he executive branch shall 
construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal courts from exercising 
subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including 
 
 73. U.S. v. Story, 891 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 74. Id. at 993, 994. 
 75. Id. at 994. 
 76. OLC Signing Statements, supra note 51, at 136 (citing Berry v. Dept. of Justice, 733 F.2d 
1343, 1349–50 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 77. Id. (citing Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658, 661–62 (4th Cir. 1969)). 
 78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2816 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(―Of course in its discussion of legislative history the Court wholly ignores the President‘s signing 
statement, which explicitly set forth his understanding that the DTA ousted jurisdiction over pending 
cases.‖). 
 79. Id. at 2763. 
 80. Id. at 2764. 
 81. Id. at 2765. 
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applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1005.‖82 
President Bush‘s interpretation would have provided legislative support 
for the government‘s interpretation of the DTA. However, as Justice 
Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Court did not consider the signing 
statement.
83
 
The Hamdan case did not settle the matter, but shed at least some 
light on how the Supreme Court will view signing statements. 
 
3.  Constitutional avoidance 
 
The President‘s duty to uphold the constitution may give him wiggle 
room to ignore another constitutional duty: to enforce the laws. One 
commentator put it this way: ―The tension here is evident: to ‗save‘ a 
statute from unconstitutionality the President may ignore his 
constitutional duties under the Take Care Clause.‖84 This usage is more 
controversial than the two discussed above.
85
 This is true, probably not 
because of the actual effect of the signing statement, but the perceived 
effect. The perception is that the President is rewriting the legislation, or 
ignoring the intent of Congress. In reality this constitutional avoidance 
principle is founded on sound reasoning and precedent. 
As discussed above, the President engages in statutory interpretation, 
and should do so in the same manner as courts. One of the methods 
courts use to interpret laws is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
86
 
Chief Justice Holmes explained this doctrine as follows: ―the rule is 
settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of 
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty 
is to adopt that which will save the Act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the 
rule is the same.‖87 Because it is appropriate for courts to apply this 
doctrine, it follows that the President should be able to do the same when 
engaging in statutory interpretation. If the President can interpret laws 
this way, then he should also be able to make his interpretation public. 
While the concept of the Executive engaging in statutory 
interpretation is uncontroversial, it is the means by which the President 
 
 82. President‘s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the ―Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza 
Act, 2006‖ (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/ 
12/print/20051230 8.html. 
 83. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 126 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 183, 195 (2007). 
 85. OLC Signing Statements, supra note 51, at 132. 
 86. Rosenkranz Senate, supra note 57. 
 87. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring). 
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executes his interpretation that can be problematic. The perceived 
problem with this type of signing statement really belongs to another 
group altogether: signing statements including an intention not to 
enforce. After all, it is not the rhetorical exertion or presidential authority 
that worries people, but the apparent disregard for the enactments of 
Congress. 
 
D.  Intention Not to Enforce on Constitutional Grounds 
 
As discussed above, there is a long history of Presidents refusing to 
enact laws or provisions in laws that they believe to be 
unconstitutional.
88
 They have done this in three ways. First, they have 
vetoed bills and returned them to Congress.
89
 Second, they have issued 
signing statements in which they express their concerns with the bill, 
sign it, but then refuse to enforce it.
90
 Third, they say nothing about the 
bill, but still do not enforce it.
91
 This historical precedent alone is not 
enough to quell the debate over the constitutionality of this method. 
On its face, the Constitution gives the President only three options 
when he is presented with a bill from Congress: (1) sign it, (2) return it 
with his objections, and (3) he may do nothing, and after 10 days, it will 
enter into law as if he had signed it.
92
 According to the ABA Report, 
these were the only options the Framers intended the President to have.
93
 
Some commentators believe George Washington and Thomas Jefferson 
each felt they had a duty to veto any unconstitutional law.
94
 It is also 
clear that other early Presidents, James Madison, James Monroe, and 
Andrew Jackson felt they had to veto unconstitutional legislation.
95
 
While it is clear that the concept of a duty to veto is well rooted in 
history, the signing statement is also well grounded historically. Has the 
signing statement evolved into a fourth option? 
Professor Charles Ogletree, a member of the American Bar 
Association task force that examined signing statements, framed the 
issue this way: ―The essential issue is whether a president, who objects to 
a law being enacted by Congress through its constitutionally prescribed 
 
 88. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art 1 § 7. 
 93. ABA Report, supra note 10, at 18. 
 94. Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 84–86 (2007). 
 95. Id. at 86. It should be noted here, that James Monroe is credited with having invented the 
signing statement. 
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procedures, should either veto that law, or find other ways to challenge 
it.‖96 According to Professor Ogletree, any signing statement that 
suggests a law is unconstitutional ―raises serious legal considerations.‖97 
These considerations arise because the President seems to have changed 
or ignored legislation rather than using his veto power. The President‘s 
power of interpretation, said Ogletree, must be balanced with the powers 
granted to the Legislative and Judicial Branches.
98
 Failure to do so ―is 
not only bad public policy, but also creates a unilateral and unchecked 
exercise of authority in one branch of government without the interaction 
and consideration of the others.‖99 
This formalistic interpretation presents an alternative view of the 
duties binding the President, and has garnered the support of Justice 
Scalia, who wrote in a concurring opinion that the President has ―the 
power to veto encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard them when they 
are unconstitutional.‖100 This formalistic view raises an interesting 
question as to what the outcome would be when a President vetoes 
legislation, and then Congress overcomes his veto with a two-thirds vote. 
Must the President enforce a provision he considers unconstitutional? 
The long and consistent practice of Presidents using the signing 
statement to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws is, perhaps, the best 
argument in its favor.
101
 Another argument in favor of the signing 
statement over the veto is that it is not possible to create unconstitutional 
law. ―A President could take the plausible formalist position that an 
unconstitutional statutory provision is not a law no matter who may have 
purported to enact or approve it. A President‘s signature on a piece of 
paper purporting to create an unconstitutional statute would then have no 
necessary legal effect . . . .‖102 If there is no legal effect, there is no 
violation of duty. 
Under this view, what then is the standard the President must follow 
when disregarding a statute as unconstitutional? An Office of Legal 
Counsel opinion provided this general rule: if ―the President, exercising 
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate 
the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court would agree with 
 
 96. Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
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Director, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice, Harvard Law School.). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
 101. Prakash, supra note 94, at 86–87. 
 102. Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 95, 101 (2007). 
 167] PRESIDENTIAL VETO AND SIGNING STATEMENTS 183 
him, the President has the authority to decline to execute the statute.‖103 
If the Court would likely uphold the law as Constitutional, the President 
is bound to enforce the law.
104
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
After all the evaluation, the question remains, does it matter? Any 
time an issue of power grabbing arises, it is appropriate for political 
leaders, scholars, journalists, and citizens to examine the practices of the 
various branches of government. Still, many commentators think the 
debate has been overblown. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michelle 
Boardman testified at the Senate hearings that signing statements do not 
present any constitutional strain. 
 
First, the signing statements do not diminish Congressional power, 
because Congress has no power to enact unconstitutional laws. This 
fact is true whether the President issues a constitutional signing 
statement or not. Second, the statements do not augment presidential 
power. Where Congress, perhaps inadvertently, exceeds its own power 
in violation of the Constitution, the President is bound to defer to the 
Constitution. The President cannot adopt the provisions he prefers and 
ignore those he does not; he must execute the laws as the Constitution 
requires.
105
 
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the courts are uncertain what weight to 
give to these statements in interpreting the law.
106
 Perhaps the strongest 
argument that the issue received more attention than it deserved was the 
way the political process corrected itself. After President Bush‘s 
widespread use of the signing statement became public knowledge in 
2006, the veto re-emerged. The President‘s use of the signing statement 
dropped off significantly. Perhaps that is the strength of the American 
system of government and the real reason signing statements are not a 
reason for great concern. 
Whether it matters or not, signing statements will likely remain a 
matter of public and political concern. As a new President takes office 
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next year, it remains to be seen if the signing statement‘s usage will 
continue, expand, or fall off in the face of public criticism. 
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